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Conservation program administrators must understand what they are getting 
- both out on the land and inside the Beltway. 
by JunJie Wu, Richard M . A dams, David Z ilberman, and Bruce Babcock 
Payments to landowners are a major vehicle to assure resource con-servation and enviro nmental pro tection. Examples of payment 
programs are listed in the sidebar, page 34. Some of these programs 
(1 , 2 and 3) co mpensate resource owners for changing reso urce 
uses while others (4 , 5 and 6) invo lve the outrigh t purchase of a 
reso urce. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
has compensated landowners to tetire 37 million acres of highly 
Figure 1: County-Average 
CRP Rental Rates for the 
First Twelve CRP Signups 
Dollar/Acre . 12-40 . 50 - 60 . 70-113 
40 - 50 • 60 - 70 0 No CRP 
erodible cropland at a current an n ual cost of approximately $l. 8 
bill ion, and the Nature Conservancy has pro teC[ed more than 11 
million acres of environmentally val uable land in the United States 
thro ugh purchase or donation. 
T he main chal lenges for a program manager who wants to max-
imize enviro nmental benefi ts are (1) to de termine which resources 
to target for pro tection and (2) to decide how to al loca te funds 
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among geographic areas. Three popular targeting criteria 
are: 
• Cost targeting - using funds to purchase a specific 
resource at the least cost. 
• Benefit targeting - using funds to purchase resources 
that provide the highest environmental benefi t per 
reso u rce uni t. 
• Benefit-cost targeting - using funds to purchase 
resources that provide the highest ~enefit per dollar 
expended. 
The differences among these targeting criteria can be 
illustrated using a hypothetical example. Suppose there 
are three cropland parcels with annual rental rates of 
$ 100, $ 150, and $200, respectively. If retired from crop 
production, rhey will provide $100, $300, and $350, 
respectively, of environmencal benefit per acre. If only 
one piece of land is targeted for a given conservation 
practice, then cost 
Cost targeting leads to 
purchase of resources 
that provide few environ-
mental benefits, and 
benefit targeting leads to 
retirement of highly 
productive resources. 
targeting would 
choose the first par-
cel because its rencal 
rate is lowest. Bene-
fit targeting would 
choose the third par-
cel because it pro-
vides the highest 
environmencal ben-
efi t per acre, and 
benefit-cost target-
ing would choose 
34 
the second parcel 
because it provides the highest ratio of environmental 
benefits to rental cost. 
The CRP provides a practical example for the three tar-
geting criteria. When the program began in 1986, envi-
ronmental qua li ty improvements were viewed as syn-
onymous wi th a reduction in so il erosion. Program rules 
targeted benefits and restricted eligibility primarily to 
highly erodible croplands. This focus on soil erosion 
changed during the implementation process. The first 
nine sign ups of the CRP were subject to mandatory min-
imum annual enro llmenc levels established by the 1985 
Food Security Act. In an effort to meet these enro llmenc 
levels, program administrators accepted bids as long as land 
eligibility criteria were met and the rencal rate requested 
by the producer did not exceed the USDA maximum 
rental rate established for the area. The experience of 
CRP implementation before 1990 was consistent with 
acreage maximization (Reicheldefer and Boggess). In 
recent years, the CRP rule has moved toward benefit-
cost targeting, where the benefit is measured using an 
Environmencal Benefits Index that reflects the multiple 
environmencal attributes of land. 
Several recent studies have examined the designs of 
"targeted" conservation programs. Some focus on the 
econom ic, environmental, and/or distributional impli-
cations of alternative targeting criteria, and others focus 






1. The Conservation Reserve Program aims to 
reduce soil erosion and increase wi ldlife and 
native plant habitats by retiring environmen-
tally valuable cropland (highly erodible crop-
land prior to 1990). The current annual budget 
of the program is approximately $1.8 billion. 
2. The Environmental Quality Incentives Pro-
gram, estab lished in the 1996 Farm Bill, tar-
gets "geographic priority areas" to "maximize 
environmental benefits per dollar expended," 
with an authorized budget of $1.3 billion (The 
Natural Resources Conservation Service, avail-
able at <http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/OPAI 
FB960PA/MiscFB.htmb January 28, 1999). 
3. The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Pro-
gram has recently allocated $500 million to the 
states of Oregon and Washington for salmonid 
protection. 
4. The Federal and State Governments will pay 
$380 million for the purchase of the world's 
largest grove of old-growth redwood still in pri-
vate hands, the Headwater's Grove, located on 
Pacific Lumber lands in Humboldt County, Cal-
ifornia (available at <http://www.ceres.ca.govcra/ 
headwaters/faq .htmb Januaty 3,2000). 
5. The Nature Conservancy has protected, 
through purchases or donation, more than 11 mil-
lion acres of environmencally valuable land in the 
United States and manages 1,340 preserves 
(The Nature Conservancy, available at <http:// 
www.mc.org/frames/index.hrml?/welcome/index. 
htmb January 3,2000). 
6. Debt-for-nature swaps were developed to trans-
form commercial debt of developing countries 
inco finance for the environment. Since the first 
debt-for-nature swap was completed (for Bolivia, 
in 1987), nearly US$200 million of third world 
debt have been extinguished (The Conserva-






Annual Water Quality 
Benefit Per CRP Acre for the 
First Twelve CRP Signups 
Ooliar/Acre/Year 
• -3 -11 
11 -19 
. 19 - 28 
. 28 - 45 
. 45 - 946 
D No CRP 
Figure 3: 
Estimated County-Average 
Annual Water Quality 
Benefit Per CRP Dollar for 
the First Twelve CRP 
Signups 
Ooliar/Ooliar/Year 
• -0.06 - 0.23 
0.23 - 0.39 
• 0.39 - 0.6 
• 0.6 - 0.97 
• 0.97 - 21 .02 
D No CRP 
Figure 4: 
Estimated County-Average 
Annual Soil Erosion 
Reduction Per CRP Acre 
for the First Twelve CRP 
Signups 
Tons/Ooliar/Year 
• -0.04 - 0.19 
0.19-0.26 
• 0.26 - 0.35 
• 0.35 - 0.47 
• 0.47 - 4.66 
D No CRP 
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on the allocation of funds amo ng geographic areas such 
as watersheds or states. In what follows, we first review 
the key factors that affect the outcomes of alternative tar-
geting criteria for a given area, and then discuss the key 
factors that affect the outcomes of fund allocation among 
geographic areas. 
Factors Affecting Performance 
The relationship berween environmental benefits and 
the costs of purchasing those benefi ts affects the effi-
ciency of a targeting criterion (Babcock et a1.). If resources 
that provide a high level of environmental benefit are rel-
atively inexpensive to purchase, then all three targeting 
criteria lead to the same outcome. However, if resources 
that provide a high level of environmental benefit are 
more costly to purchase, then use of cost or benefit tar-
geting leads to inefficiency. Cost targeting leads to pur-
chase of resources that provide few environmental ben-
efits, and benefit targeting 
benefits, respectively. Similarly, Berck and Bendey esti-
mate that including more acres of old-growth redwood 
in the Redwood National Park sign ifi cantly increased 
redwood lumber price. The 1978 taki ng alone increased 
redwood lumber prices by 26 percent. These price 
increases lead to increased incentives to harvest old-growth 
redwood on unprotected lands. Ignoring the "slippage" 
effect of land retirement programs wi ll reduce environ-
mental gains and possibly make a program counterpro-
ductive (Wu, Zi lberman, and Babcock). Reducing slip-
page may require targeting idle marginal resources to 
prevent them from entering production. 
Factors Affecting Efficiency 
The important factors that affect the efficiency of fund 
al location among geograph ic areas include offsite envi-
ronmental benefits , threshold effects of conservation 
efforts, and the relationships berween alternative envi-
ronmental benefits. 
leads to retirement of highly 
productive resources. 
The importance of the 
relationship between the 
number of environmental 
benefits and the COSt of 
acquiring them can be illus-
trated using CRP as an 
Threshold effects must 
also be considered in the 
design and targeting of 
conservation programs. 
U.S. conservation pro-
grams have traditionally 
been targeted with onsite 
benefits in mind. The CRP 
was designed to prevent soil 
loss from land targeted as 
highly erodib le. Applica-
example. Figure 1 shows the average CRP rental rates 
across counti es for the first rwelve sign ups. The average 
county rental rates range from $12 per acre to $113 per 
acre. Under cost targeting, counties in blue in Figure 1 
(low cost per acre) are targeted first. Figure 2 shows the 
average annual water-quality benefits per CRP acre across 
counties. These benefits were estimated by multiplying 
the reduction in co unty-average soil erosion per CRP 
acre by the damages caused per ton of soil eros ion as 
reported in Ribaudo (1989). Annual water quality ben-
efit per CRP acre ranges from minimal to $946. Under 
benefit targeting, counties in blue in Figure 2 are tar-
geted first. Figure 3 shows the county-average water qual-
ity benefit per CRP do llar. Under benefit-cost targeting, 
counties in blue in Figure 3 are targeted first. T hese fig-
ures show little correspondence among blue shaded areas. 
Under each specific targeting criterion, CRP dollars would 
be sh ifted from red-colored counties to blue-colored 
counties . Under benefit-cost targeting (Figure 3) some 
CRP dollars wo uld be shifted ftom the Northern Plains 
and Corn Belt to the Northeast. This sh ift wi ll not take 
place under cost targeting. 
"Slippage" also affects the performance of a targeting 
criterion. Retirement ofland and other resources reduces 
total ptoduction and increases output prices, which can 
lead to utilization of previous ly idle marginal resources. 
Wu estimates that for each one hundred acres of cropland 
retired under the CRP in the central U.S., 20 acres of 
non-cropland were brought into production, offsetting 9 
percent and 14 percent ofCRP water and wind eros ion 
tions for funding in USDA's 
Envi ronmental Q uali ty Incentive Program (EQIP) are 
often accepted based simply on the miles of streamside habi-
tat protected or tons reduction in soil erosion. Increasingly 
we know that conservation practices generate benefits 
both on and off the targeted site. Onsite benefits include 
reduced soil erosio n and chemical loss that lead to 
increased farm productivity. Off-site benefits from the 
same programs may include water quality improvements, 
wildlife habitat enhancements, recreational opportuni-
ties, and human health protection. Growing evidence 
shows that offsite benefi tS from conservation may be 
greater d1an onsite benefits. 
The importance of off site benefits is demonstrated by 
Ribaudo's 1986 analysis of CRP targeting using both 
onsite and offsite benefits. He argues that if conserva-
tion programs are intended to maximize society's bene-
fit, then botl1 ons ite and offsite benefits must be consid-
ered in the targeting criterion. This result can be illustrated 
using Figure 4, which shows county-average ann ual so il 
erosion reduction per CRP dollar. If maximizing tons of 
soil erosion reduction (an onsite measure) is the program 
objective, CRP dollars would be shifted from d1e North-
east to the Northern Plains. The opposite would happen 
if maximizing water quality benefits (an offsite measure) 
is the program objective (Figure 3). 
T h reshold effects must also be considered in me design 
and targeting of conservation programs. Threshold effects 
are present when a significant environmental improvement, 
such as the survival of a d1reatened species, can be achieved 
onl y after conservation effo rts reach a certai n leve l of 
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imensity (th reshold). Such effects have been idemified 
in many conserva tion efforrs, particularly those involv-
ing fi sh and wildlife. T he U .S. policy of targeting co n-
servatio n programs on the bas is of onsite criteri a has 
caused programs to ignore threshold effects. Funds may 
be overly dispersed geographically, and fundin g levels in 
an y given program area may be inadequate to reach the 
threshold needed for a significam environmental improve-
ment. When the total budget is small, ignoring thresh-
old effects may result in a substantial enviro nmental ben-
efit loss (Wu, Adams and Boggess). 
Relationships among alternative environmemal ben-
efits should also be co nsidered in the des ign and target-
ing of conservation programs (Wu and Boggess) . T he 
relationship can take rwo forms: interaction and correlation. 
Interaction refers to the causal relationships among al ter-
nati ve environmental benefi ts . For example, improved 
stream water quality enhances fis h habitat. Correlation 
refers to the situation where two environmem al benefits 
are jointly produced by the same conservation practice, 
al though tlley have no causal relationship . For example, 
land retirements not only reduce so il eros ion, bur also 
protect groundwater quality. Babcock, et aI. , fo und that 
there are significant tradeoffs between environm em al 
benefits when differem targeting criteria are used in the 
CRP Wu and Boggess show tll at ignoring the relationship 
may result in not only a misallocatio n of co nservatio n 
funds am o ng geographi cal areas, but a lso inco rrect 
resources being targe ted fo r conservation practi ces . 
Future Challenges 
T he optimal design and targeting of conservation pro-
grams must recognize the complexity of ecosystems. W hile 
a lack of data from natural sciences often makes the des ign 
and implementation of highly effective programs difficult, 
research and advances in analyti c too ls, such as Geo-
graphic Information Sys tems, should improve the over-
all efficiency of conserva tio n progra ms. T he potenti al 
payoffs from such improvemems are substanti al, since 
the United States spends billions of dollars on conserva-
tion programs each year. 
Political pressures pose another major challenge for the 
optimal des ign and targeting of conservation programs. 
Despite calls for "targeting" and "prioritizing," restrictions 
designed to spread funds more evenly over Congress ional 
Distri cts and taxpaye rs often di ctate the allocation of 
public conse rva ti on funds (Wu and Boggess) . T hese 
res tr ictio ns are likely to result in effi ciency losses . In 
addition, fund all oca ti on is likely to be influenced by 
special interest groups that prefer and lobby for di ffe r-
em targeting strategies . W u, Z ilberman, and Babcock 
showed that for a fixed budge t, cost targe ting results in 
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the larges t reduction in production and, thus, the largest 
increase in output prices . It should be favo red by resource 
owners since both the resources reti red and the resources 
remaining to be exploited will have higher market prices. 
Benefi t targeting has the smal lest impact on output price 
and ove rall reso urce use amo ng the three stra tegies, 
because the cos t of the targeted resources is not consid-
ered in the decision of which reso urces ro purchase. T his 
stra tegy sh o uld be fa vored by co nsumers and input 
providers. Benefit-cos t targe ting provides more envi-
ro nmental benefi ts than cost or benefit targe ting when 
the output price is fixed . It should be preferred by envi-
ro nmentalists. H owever, when slippage is prese nt, ben-
efit-cos t targeting no longer max imizes total environ-
mental benefit for a given budget and should not be the 
preferred strategy fo r any group. T hus, it is not surp ris-
ing that poli tics affect how conservation funds are allo-
cated . Research that quantifies the economic and envi-
ronmental tradeoffs involved under al ternative targeting 
schemes can help policymakers design targeting schemes 
to meet b road public environmental goals. While the 
involvement of various interest groups will persist in fed-
eral fu nding programs, further economic analysis can 
serve to m ake the costs of alternative ta rgeting schemes 
more transpare nt. • 
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